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Articles
Uneasy Alliances
Bolshevik Co-optation Policy and the Case of 
Chechen Sheikh Ali Mitaev
Jeronim Perović
On 15 January 1923, a high-ranking Soviet delegation traveled to Urus-
Martan, the biggest aul (village) of Chechnya. The purpose was to inform 
the population that the Soviet government had granted the Chechens an 
autonomous region (avtonomnaia oblast´ ).1 Originally, the meeting was 
to be held in Groznyi, which was not an administrative part of the new 
Chechen region, but where the newly established Revolutionary Committee 
(revkom), the provisional government of Chechnya, had its seat. If the larger 
population was to become acquainted with Soviet power, however, the news 
had to be conveyed outside the confines of Groznyi, a city living largely on 
its oil industry and inhabited mostly by Russians, to the auls of the Chechen 
populated countryside.2
The Soviet delegation was led by Anastas Mikoian, head of the 
Southeastern Bureau, the North Caucasus office of the Central Committee 
of the Russian Communist Party located in Rostov-on-Don. The delegation 
included Kliment Voroshilov, a member of the bureau and commander of 
the North Caucasus Military Region, as well as two of his deputies, Semen 
Budennyi and Mikhail Levandovskii. Also joining the Soviet delegates was 
Tashtemir El´darkhanov (1870–1934), one of the few indigenous Chechen 
Communists and head of the Chechen revkom, and several other members 
of the Chechen government. Although the Soviet delegates considered a 
journey to Chechnya a risky undertaking, they did not want to appear as a 
hostile power and thus refrained from bringing a military escort. They were, 
 1 Chechnya was granted the status of an autonomous region by decree of the All-Russian 
Central Executive Committee of 30 November 1923. See “Autonomy for the Chechens,” 
below. 
 2 A. I. Mikoian, “Iz vospominanii,” Iunost´, no. 3 (1967): 44–56, 51.
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however, accompanied by two military bands whose musicians apparently 
had weapons hidden under their coats.3 
Some 2,000–3,000 riders on horseback accompanied the delegates on 
the last section of their journey to Urus-Martan, where they were greeted 
by some 10,000 people, including inhabitants of Urus-Martan as well as 
representatives from different Chechen auls.4 The large number of village 
elders and religious figures among them gave the Soviet delegates a friendly 
welcome. After the Bolsheviks and the Chechen representatives held their 
speeches, the village elders managed to convince their guests not to return 
to Groznyi but to stay overnight.5 The atmosphere during the evening was 
festive, dances and plays were organized, and Budennyi, who according to 
Mikoian had already made a most favorable impression on the Chechens 
during his speech, successfully performed the lezginka, the traditional dance 
of the mountaineer peoples of the Caucasus.6
Although the meeting with the Chechens was largely harmonious, the 
world the Bolsheviks encountered was far from their liking. According to 
Voroshilov, who described his impressions in a letter to Stalin on 21 January 
1923, the “Chechens were no better or worse than other mountaineers [gortsy],” 
yet they had more “mullahs, sheikhs, and other devilry [chertovshchina] than 
others—for example, the Karachai and even the Kabardian peoples,” and their 
“fanaticism, backwardness, and ignorance [were] extraordinary.”7 Voroshilov 
was convinced that a socialist transformation of “mullah-dominated 
Chechnya” would eventually become possible, but only once the Bolsheviks 
were able to rely on a “cadre of efficient and loyal party workers.” As long as 
this was not the case, he saw no other option than to cooperate with “mullahs 
and similar such gentlemen [mully i prochie gospoda].”8 To be sure, he also 
greatly disliked El´darkhanov, whom he described as a “spineless, weak-
minded, stupid, and arrogant old geezer.”9 This attitude was typical among 
 3 This is reported by Budennyi in his memoirs: S. M. Budennyi, Proidennyi put´ (Moscow: 
Voenizdat, 1973), 3:305–6. 
 4 In his published memoirs, Mikoian indicates 2,000 riders and 10,000 people who met 
them in Urus-Martan: Mikoian, “Iz vospominanii,” 52. In his letter to Stalin of 21 January 
1923, Voroshilov mentions 2,500–3,000 riders and 7,000–8,000 people who gathered in 
Urus-Martan. According to Voroshilov, Urus-Martan had some 30,000 inhabitants in total. 
See L. S. Gatagova et al., eds., TsK RKP(b)–VKP(b) i natsional´nyi vopros, 1: 1918–1933 
(Moscow: Rosspen, 2005), 94–95, 94. 
 5 Mikoian, “Iz vospominanii,” 52.
 6 Ibid.
 7 Voroshilov’s letter to Stalin, 21 January 1923 (Gatagova et al., TsK RKP(b)–VKP(b) i 
natsional´nyi vopros, 94).
 8 Ibid.
 9 Ibid., 95.
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leading Bolsheviks toward indigenous local Communists, whom they often 
regarded as too lenient and inclined to compromise and thus not likely to 
enforce radical changes. Yet Voroshilov acknowledged that for the time being, 
there simply was no alternative.10
The Bolsheviks’ readiness to cooperate with Muslims and thereby to 
accept, at least for the time being, the existence of sharia courts, Islamic schools, 
or Islamic charitable endowments (waqf ), did not reflect a tolerant mindset. 
Rather, it constituted a flexible policy approach of forging tactical alliances 
with various forces and factions within society in exchange for loyalty. This 
approach largely grew out of the experience of the Civil War, which in the 
North Caucasus and in other places such as Central Asia lasted well into the 
1920s. While Muslims flooded the ranks of the Communists in their struggle 
against the representatives of the former tsarist regime, many took up arms 
against the Bolsheviks in response to the social and economic crises brought 
about in the course of war by famine, the ruthless behavior by members of 
the Red Army and the secret police, and forceful grain requisitions ordered 
by the Soviet authorities. While many areas of the former Russian Empire 
saw peasant unrest, the largest armed revolts broke out in Muslim borderland 
regions, which looked back on long and fierce colonial wars during the 19th 
century. 
In Central Asia, the bloodiest of these revolts was the so-called Basmachi 
Uprising, which had started in 1918 in the Ferghana Valley and later spread 
to other parts of Turkestan as well as the former tsarist protectorates of Khiva 
and Bukhara. The revolt was suppressed by the Red Army by mid-1922, yet 
armed bands and smaller rebellions continued to trouble the region well into 
the 1930s.11 In the North Caucasus, the largest anti-Soviet rebellion began 
in the summer of 1920 and was led by a number of sheikhs, among them 
Nazhmuddin Gotsinskii, who had never allied with either the Whites or 
the Bolsheviks. Although the Red Army succeeded by the spring of 1921 in 
defeating this rebellion after hard-won battles, Gotsinskii remained at large, 
as did a number of other prominent anti-Soviet rebel leaders.12 
10 Ibid.
11 Sergei Abashin with Kamoludin Abdullaev, Ravshan Abdullaev, and Arslan Koichiev, 
“Soviet Rule and the Delineation of Borders in the Ferghana Valley, 1917–1930,” in Ferghana 
Valley: The Heart of Central Asia, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2011), 
94–118, 99–102. For an inside account on the Basmachi movement, see H. B. Paksoy, “The 
Basmachi Movement from Within: An Account of Zeki Velidi Togan,” Nationalities Papers 23, 
2 (1995): 373–99.
12 Khadzhi Murat Donogo, “Nazhmuddin Gotsinskii,” Voprosy istorii, no. 6 (2005): 34–57, 
46–50. For a general overview, see I. Kh. Sulaev, Musul´manskoe dukhovenstvo Dagestana 
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In this situation, achieving stability dominated the agenda of the 
Bolshevik leadership. One way to win non-Russians and Muslims over was 
to accommodate aspirations for self-determination through the creation of 
autonomous administrative units in the form of ethnically defined regions 
(oblasti ) and republics. Within these territories, members of the so-called 
titular nationalities were actively promoted to administrative positions of 
power. This policy constituted an important aspect of the Bolshevik program 
of korenizatsiia (indigenization), the promotion of national languages and 
cultures.13 At the same time, the creation of new ethnically defined territories 
was meant to strengthen (or create) ethnic national identity as opposed to 
Muslim or larger regional—for example, pan-Turkic—identities. Creating 
autonomous administrative units was thus seen as essential to achieving 
efficient control and modernization in these economically backward regions.14 
Another strategy was to enter into alliances with diverse representatives 
of Muslim society. The Bolsheviks’ most natural allies were Muslim socialist 
reformers and members of the intelligentsia, some of whom had already allied 
with the Bolsheviks during the Civil War, although others fiercely opposed 
them from the beginning. In addition to these Russian-educated Muslims, 
however, the Bolsheviks also reached out to Muslim traditional believers and 
Sufi sheikhs, whom they co-opted into party and state structures, in several 
instances even into regional governments. In Dagestan, Sheikh Ali-Khadzhi 
Akushinskii, one of the key leaders of Muslim resistance against the White 
movement in the North Caucasus, was invited into the Dagestan revkom in 
1920 and appointed head of the Sharia Department of Dagestan’s People’s 
Commissariat of Justice, a post he held until December 1921, when he had 
a falling-out with Soviet power.15 In Bukhara, at least 1 of the 11 members 
of the regional Soviet government in 1923 seems to have been a “mullah” (a 
i svetskaia vlast´: Bor´ba i sotrudnichestvo (Makhachkala: Dagestanskii gosudarstvennyi 
universitet, 2004).
13 On the Soviet policy of korenizatsiia, see Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: 
Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2001); and Francine Hirsch, Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making 
of the Soviet Union (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005). 
14 Abashin, “Soviet Rule and the Delineation of Borders in the Ferghana Valley,” 105; 
Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, Muslim National Communism in the Soviet 
Union: A Revolutionary Strategy for the Colonial World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1979), 82.
15 Ali-Khadzhi Akushinskii subsequently retreated to his home district (Akusha), where 
he wielded considerable influence. He was arrested with his family in 1928. See Vladimir 
Bobrovnikov, “Waqf Endowments in Daghestani Village Communities: From the 1917 
Revolution to the Collectivization,” Die Welt des Islam 50, 3 (2010): 477–502, 481; and 
“Mirotvorets Ali-Khadzhi Akushinskii,” Dagestanskaia pravda, 27 October 2009 (http://
dagistanhistory.livejournal.com/8232.html, accessed 7 January 2013). For a recent defensive 
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designation generally used by the Bolsheviks for Islamic teachers or spiritual 
figures).16 In Turkestan in the early 1920s, the Central Committee had a 
Muslim majority,17 and half the members of the regional communist party 
were reportedly religious believers.18 
Although the Bolshevik party leadership backed the policy of co-optation, 
indigenous Muslim “national Communists” played a key role in bringing 
about these alliances.19 These national Communists were often convinced 
Bolsheviks, yet many of them advocated coexistence between Islam and 
socialism. For example, in June 1923, Sultanbek Kodzhdanov, the deputy first 
secretary of the Turkestan Communist Party, argued before a large session of 
delegates from the national regions and republics held in Moscow that going 
against religion would only play into the hands of those who condemned 
Bolshevik Sovietization attempts as a new colonial project. He considered 
Islam a “very good thing,” which should be used as a civilizing force to tie the 
people to the Soviet cause and counter anti-Soviet tendencies.20 Moreover, as 
his comrade from Bukhara, Faisulla Khodzhaev, explained during the same 
meeting, restoring sharia courts or returning confiscated waqf property to the 
mosques would restore functioning social structures in light of the almost 
total absence of Soviet state structures.21 
Very little is known about Bolshevik policy toward those local Muslim 
religious leaders who were temporarily co-opted into government structures, 
despite the large body of Western literature on the formation of the Soviet 
Union, including surveys of the Caucasus and Central Asia as well as general 
studies on Soviet policies toward Islam and on the fates of prominent national 
biography on Akushinskii, see M. A. Abdullaev, Triumf i tragediia sheikh-ul’-islama Dagestana 
Ali-Khadzhi Akushinskogo (Makhachkala: Epokha, 2013).
16 Stalin alluded to this in his speech before representatives from nearly all the national regions 
and republics at the fourth session of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party 
(Bolshevik) (CC RCP[b]), Moscow, 9–12 June 1923. See Tainy natsional´noi politiki TsK RKP: 
Chetvertoe soveshchanie TsK RKP s otvetstvennymi rabotnikami natsional´nykh respublik i oblastei 
v Moskve 9–12 iiunia 1923 g. Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow: INSAN, 1992), 262.
17 Most of these appear to have been Jadids advocating coexistence between Islam and 
socialism. See Adeeb Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 298.
18 Sultanbek Khodzhanov, a delegate from Turkestan, made this claim in his speech at the 
fourth session of the CC RCP(b), Moscow, 9–12 June 1923 (Tainy natsional´noi politiki TsK 
RKP, 111). 
19 Alexandre Bennigsen introduced this term to denote the wide spectrum of Muslim 
communist leaders (Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union).
20 Tainy natsional´noi politiki TsK RKP, 111–12. 
21 Ibid., 166–67.
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Communists during Stalinism.22 There are hardly any detailed studies 
explaining how alliances between the Bolsheviks and these Muslim religious 
representatives came about, which actors were involved in these decisions, 
and how the Bolsheviks eventually extracted themselves from these alliances 
of convenience.
This article sheds light on these questions by analyzing one of the most 
intriguing examples of co-optation: the case of Ali Mitaev, a prominent 
political and religious leader in Chechnya at the time. Initially an ally of 
the Bolsheviks during the Russian Civil War, he fell out of grace with the 
leading Bolshevik representative in Chechnya early in 1920. During the 
meeting in Urus-Martan in January 1923, the Soviet delegates invited Mitaev 
to negotiate. They agreed to include him in the Chechen revkom, where he 
became an official member in April 1923. After holding this office for about a 
year, he was arrested by the Soviet secret police in April 1924 and put to death 
in October 1925. Shortly before his execution, the Soviet leadership launched 
a major disarmament drive in Chechnya and removed leading figures of the 
Chechen government from their posts—including El´darkhanov, who had 
supported Mitaev. The disarmament campaign also targeted Gotsinskii and a 
number of other leading anti-Bolshevik rebels, who were captured, arrested, 
and shot. 
Mitaev’s fate, which can be traced through published Soviet documents 
and original sources from Russian archives, sheds light on the establishment 
of Soviet power in Chechnya during the formative period of state building 
in the early 1920s. This article thereby provides insight into the fluidity of 
state-building processes that characterized the situation in one of the most 
troublesome spots of the Soviet Union. The history of Chechnya in the 
early Soviet period remains largely underexplored, despite numerous recent 
studies—mostly historical overviews of Chechen history rather than in-depth 
historical investigations—that have sought to better understand the roots of 
the Chechen wars of secession in the 1990s.23 The case of Mitaev illustrates 
22 See, e.g., Jörg Baberowski, Der Feind ist überall: Stalinismus im Kaukasus (Munich: Deutsche 
Verlags-Anstalt, 2003); Alex Marshall, The Caucasus under Soviet Rule (London: Routledge, 
2010); Adrienne L. Edgar, Tribal Nation: The Making of Soviet Turkmenistan (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2004); or the comprehensive work on Stalinism in Central Asia 
by Niccolò Pianciola, Stalinismo di frontiera: Colonizzazione agricola, stermino dei nomadi 
e costruzione statale in Asia centrale, 1905–1936 (Rome: Viella, 2009). On policy, see, e.g., 
Bennigsen’s “Paris school,” which published on Soviet policy on Islam during the 1960s and 
1970s (Alexandre Benningsen and Chantal Quelquejay, Les mouvements nationaux chez les 
Musulmans de Russie, 1: Le “Sultangalievisme” au Tatarstan [Paris: Mouton, 1960]; Bennigsen, 
Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union).
23 John B. Dunlop, Russia Confronts Chechnya: Roots of a Separatist Conflict (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998); Robert Seely, Russo-Chechen Conflict, 1800–2000: A 
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how the key players of the early 1920s—namely, the Chechen government led 
by El´darkhanov, the Southeastern Bureau led by Mikoian, and agents of the 
local branches of the Soviet secret police (the GPU/OGPU), whose members 
had opposed co-opting Mitaev in the first place, viewed the political situation 
and sought to enforce their various claims.24 Investigating the case of Ali 
Mitaev also improves our understanding of Soviet nationality policies, the 
Bolsheviks’ attitude toward Muslims, and the complex struggle for power and 
influence in the non-Russian Muslim borderlands of the Soviet Union.
The Bolsheviks and the Question of Autonomy
The North Caucasus represented one of the bloodiest arenas of the Russian 
Civil War, with tens of thousands of lives lost, hundreds of settlements 
destroyed, and large parts of the economy devastated. By the spring of 1920, 
the Bolsheviks and the Red Army, in conjunction with their Muslim allies, 
had managed to annihilate the Army of Volunteers commanded by General 
Anton Denikin. The remnants of this army were pushed back to Crimea, 
from where they eventually evacuated.25 
In the northeastern part of the Caucasus, two Dagestani sheikhs led the 
resistance against Denikin during the Civil War. Usun-Khadzhi Saltinskii 
(1845?–1920) organized the armed resistance in the mountainous parts of 
Chechnya and founded the North Caucasus Emirate, an Islamic state that 
existed from September 1919 to April 1920.26 Ali-Khadzhi Akushinskii 
(1847–1930) was, as noted above, one of the major leaders of resistance in 
Deadly Embrace (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001); Sebastian Smith, Allah’s Mountains: Politics 
and War in the Russian Caucasus (London: I. B. Tauris, 1998); Ben Fowkes, ed., Russia and 
Chechnia: The Permanent Crisis. Essays on Russo-Chechen relations (New York: St. Martin’s, 
1998). The exception is Alex Marshall’s The Caucasus under Soviet Rule, to date the best 
Western study on the North Caucasus during the early Soviet period. A number of in-depth 
studies have recently appeared on povstanchestvo in the North Caucasus during the early 1920s. 
See, e.g., S. S. Magamadov and Dzh. I. Meskhidze, “Iz istorii povstancheskogo dvizheniia na 
severo-vostochnom Kavkaze (20-e gg XX v.),” Vestnik Akademii nauk Chechenskoi Respubliki 
15, 2 (2011): 91–102.
24 V. I. Lenin created the All-Russian Emergency Commission for Combating 
Counterrevolution, Speculation, and Sabotage, better known as the Cheka, in December 
1917. In February 1922, the Cheka was formally reconstituted as the GPU (State Political 
Administration) and incorporated into the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD 
RSFSR), and from November 1923 on, into the Soviet Council of People’s Commissars, 
nominally the highest executive organ of the Soviet Union. Subsequently, the organization 
once more changed its name to OGPU (Unified State Political Administration).
25 For a general overview of events in the North Caucasus during the Russian Revolution and 
Civil War, see Marshall, The Caucasus under Soviet Rule, 51–147. 
26 Aleksei Kosterin, 1919–1920: V gorakh Kavkaza. Istoricheskii ocherk Gorskogo revoliutsionnogo 
dvizheniia (Vladikavkaz: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel´stvo, 1921), 28, 35–37.
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Dagestan. These two sheikhs fought alongside Bolshevik forces not because 
they sympathized with communist atheist ideology but as allies bound 
together by a common threat. 
In contrast to the Cossack communities of the Don and Terek, most of 
which aligned themselves with Denikin (although some fought against him), 
many non-Russian peoples of the North Caucasus, and the Muslims of Russia 
in general, were opposed to the prospect of a restoration of power under the 
slogan “Russia one and indivisible,” as professed by Denikin and other former 
tsarist generals.27 Moreover, the White Army’s often ruthless behavior and 
the haughty attitude of its generals drove many into the Bolshevik camp. 
Denikin’s troops were defeated by early 1920, however, and these alliances 
immediately began to disintegrate. The Red Army started to behave like 
an occupying force, and local Bolshevik representatives often showed open 
contempt for the population’s religious traditions and customs.28 As a result, 
the region saw a surge in violent clashes, threatening to drive leading figures 
of the former North Caucasian anti-White resistance into opposition to the 
Bolsheviks. 
In Chechnya, the Bolsheviks liberated themselves from a formidable 
potential adversary when Sheikh Usun-Khadzhi unexpectedly died in April 
1920, and they quickly set out to eliminate his emirate.29 In Dagestan, 
however, they faced a massive armed uprising in the summer of 1920. This 
movement, which started in the Dagestani districts of Andiiskii, Gubinskii, 
and Avarskii, called itself the Sharia Army of Mountain Peoples and numbered 
several thousand armed followers. By early 1921, it had engulfed large parts 
of mountainous Chechnya as well. It was supported by several influential 
sheikhs, among them the former mufti of the North Caucasus, Nazhmuddin 
Gotsinskii (1859–1925), who had opposed Denikin, the Communists, 
and those who allied with the Bolsheviks during the Civil War, such as Ali-
Khadzhi Akushinskii.30 
27 A. I. Denikin, Ocherki Russkoi Smuty (Berlin: Slovo, 1925), 4:114.
28 Donogo, “Nazhmuddin Gotsinskii,” 46.
29 Shortly before his death, the Bolsheviks led negotiations with Usun-Khadzhi and apparently 
even offered to acknowledge him as imam (Kosterin, 1919–1920: V gorakh Kavkaza, 98–99).
30 Donogo, “Nazhmuddin Gotsinskii,” 46–50. Unlike Mitaev, Gotsinskii became fairly well 
known in Western academic literature through his opponents’ publications in the 1920s. These 
included Aleksandr Todorskii, who commanded the 11th Red Army in the North Caucasus, as 
well as leading Dagestani Communists Alibek Takho-Godi and Nazhmuddin P. Samurskii. See 
Marie Bennigsen Broxup, “The Last Ghazawat: The 1920–21 Uprising,” in The North Caucasus 
Barrier: The Russian Advance towards the Muslim World, ed. Broxup (London: C. Hurst, 1992), 
112–45, 117.
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At the same time, the Bolsheviks faced massive Cossack uprisings in 
other parts of the North Caucasus and a real threat of outside intervention: 
North Caucasian émigré circles provided support for Gotsinskii and called 
on outside powers for military assistance. This was especially true of émigrés 
operating from Georgia, then still controlled by a Menshevik government 
(Azerbaijan and Armenia had fallen to the Bolsheviks in 1920, but the Red 
Army occupied Georgia only in February 1921).31
In a situation of continuing external military danger and increasing 
internal volatility, Iosif Stalin, the people’s commissar for nationality affairs, 
was the one who understood that the Bolsheviks needed to pay closer attention 
to the nationality question and make efforts to win over non-Russians and 
Muslims if they were to prevail. Already in December 1917, the Council 
of People’s Commissars issued its famous “Appeal to the Moslems of Russia 
and the East,” signed by Stalin and Vladimir Lenin, promising that their 
“beliefs and customs, [their] national and cultural institutions,” were “free 
and inviolable.” In return for the protection of these rights, Bolshevik leaders 
asked for “sympathy and support” in their “cause of building a new world.”32 
During the Civil War, Stalin took measures to co-opt, and thus bring 
under control, leading Muslim organizations, creating Muslim institutions 
(such as the Central Muslim Commissariat in Moscow) and organizing all-
Muslim conferences.33 Toward the end of the war, when cracks began to 
appear in the alliances forged between the Bolsheviks and Muslim leaders, 
the Soviet leadership issued several appeals for caution. In April 1920, Lenin 
urged local party representatives and members of the Red Army in the North 
Caucasus to show more sensitivity and a “maximum of goodwill” toward the 
Muslim population. Moreover, he appealed to the comrades in the North 
Caucasus to show sympathy for these peoples’ aspirations for “autonomy and 
independence.”34 Lenin had issued a similar statement to the comrades in 
Turkestan already in November 1919.35
31 Magamadov and Meskhidze, “Iz istorii povstancheskogo dvizheniia na severo-vostochnom 
Kavkaze,” 92–94.
32 Addressed to all “Moslems of Russia, Tartars of the Volga and the Crimea, Kirghiz, and Sarts 
of Siberia and Turkestan, Turks and Tartars of Transcaucasia, Chechens and Mountaineers of 
the Caucasus,” the appeal was published in Izvestiia, 7 December 1917, 1–2 (translation from 
www.soviethistory.org/index.php?page=article&ArticleID=1921east1&SubjectID=1921muslim
&Year=1921, accessed 1 February 2014).
33 Bennigsen, Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union, 27–29, 60.
34 Lenin to G. K. Ordzhonikidze, 2 April 1920 (V. I. Lenin, Sochineniia [Moscow: 
Gosudarstvennoe izdatel´stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1952], 30:460).
35 V. I. Lenin, “To the Communists of Turkestan,” 7–8 November 1919, published in 
Turkestanskii Kommunist, Izvestiia TsK Sovetov Turkestanskoi Respubliki, and Krasnyi Front. 
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To be sure, the Bolshevik leadership never intended to allow non-Russian 
peoples to secede from Soviet Russia, yet they were willing to absorb their 
hopes of freedom in the framework of territorial autonomy. In the autumn 
of 1920, Stalin traveled to the North Caucasus to instigate two state-
building projects: the Republic of Dagestan (Dagestanskaia ASSR), which 
was founded on 13 November 1920, and the Soviet Mountain Republic 
(Gorskaia ASSR), established four days later. While the Dagestan ASSR was 
essentially an enlarged version of the Dagestan region, which already existed 
before the 1917 revolution, the Soviet Mountain Republic encompassed 
the non-Russian peoples living south of the Terek River in the former Terek 
region—including, in addition to several Cossack communities, Chechens, 
Ingush, Ossetes, Balkars, Kabardians, and Karachai. Each nationality was 
granted its own ethnic district (okrug), while the two Russian-populated cities 
Vladikavkaz and Groznyi formed separate administrative entities within the 
republic.36 
When local Communists of the North Caucasus first debated the idea of 
creating an autonomous Soviet Mountain Republic, a majority disapproved. 
They feared that the formation of such an entity would play into the hands 
of those “reactionary” forces that dreamed of Caucasian unity and secession 
from Russia.37 In fact, the years 1917–20 had seen several attempts to form a 
united North Caucasus region. The first and most important was the creation 
of the Union of United Mountaineers of the North Caucasus and Dagestan 
(Soiuz ob˝edinennykh gortsev Severnogo Kavkaza i Dagestana), founded 
in May 1917 by a broad coalition of members of the North Caucasian 
intelligentsia. After the October Revolution, this union renamed itself the 
Mountain Republic and in April 1918 formally declared its independence 
from Russia. These efforts to build a secular state were paralleled by attempts 
to unite the North Caucasian mountaineers within the framework of an 
Islamic state, such as Usun-Khadzhi’s short-lived North Caucasus Emirate.38 
English translation in V. I. Lenin, Collected Works (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974), 
30:138.
36 Artur Tsutsiev, Atlas etnopoliticheskoi istorii Kavkaza, 1774–2004 (Moscow: Evropa, 2006), 
49, 63. On the Soviet Mountain Republic, see V. D. Dzidzoev, Ot soiuza ob˝edinennykh gortsev 
Severnogo Kavkaza i Dagestana do Gorskoi ASSR (1917–1924): Nachal´nyi etap natsional´no-
gosudarstvennogo stroitel´stva narodov Severnogo Kavkaza v XX veke (Vladikavkaz: Izdatel´stvo 
Severo-Osetinskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, 2003), 65–169; and A. Kh. Daudov, 
Gorskaia ASSR (1921–1924 gg.): Ocherki sotsial´no-ekonomicheskoi istorii (St. Petersburg: 
Izdatel´stvo Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta, 1997). 
37 Dzidzoev, Ot soiuza ob˝edinennykh gortsev Severnogo Kavkaza, 79.
38 G. I. Kakagasanov et al., eds., Soiuz ob˝edinennykh gortsev Severnogo Kavkaza i Dagestana 
(1917–1918 gg.), Gorskaia Respublika (1918–1920 gg.): Dokumenty i materialy (Makhachkala: 
Institut istorii, arkheologii i etnografii, 1994); T. M. Muzaev, Soiuz gortsev: Russkaia revoliutsiia 
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Bolshevik leaders reasoned differently from local Communists in initiating 
their state-building projects in the North Caucasus. On the one hand, they 
saw the creation of the Soviet Mountain Republic as a continuation of their 
own short-lived state-building efforts in the North Caucasus. In March 
1918, for instance, they had founded the Terek Soviet Republic, which was 
effectively crushed by Denikin’s forces in the summer of 1918.39 On the 
other hand, the Bolsheviks viewed their offer of unity and autonomy as a 
way to undermine alternative state-building projects, both those professed by 
Gotsinskii, whose aim was to establish an Islamic state based on sharia, and 
those secular projects favored by North Caucasian émigré groups.40 
In his speeches on the occasion of the foundation of the Soviet Mountain 
Republic and the Republic of Dagestan, Stalin explicitly agreed to allow the 
continued practice of sharia and adat, North Caucasus customary law. This 
cohered with his understanding of autonomy, which included the right of 
individual peoples to organize life according to their own traditions and 
customs. Moreover, the very “meaning of autonomy,” Stalin explained, was 
to draw members of the titular nations, who knew the language and were 
accustomed to the ways of life, into government bodies on all levels. Autonomy 
would give a people back the liberties that the “bloodsucking tsars” and the 
“tyrannous tsarist generals” had taken from them, and teach them to “stand 
on [their] own feet.”41 Stalin made it clear, however, that in exchange for 
granting such autonomy, he would demand unconditional loyalty to Soviet 
power, especially since the region still faced an imminent threat posed by the 
Gotsinskii uprising.42
Stalin’s promise regarding the right to uphold sharia, which the tsarist 
administrators in the Caucasus never officially prohibited but sought to 
suppress in favor of a codification of customary law, was later reaffirmed.43 
In April 1921, the government of the Soviet Mountain Republic issued the 
provision that all its citizens would be allowed the right to vote, including for 
i narody Severnogo Kavkaza, 1917–mart 1918 g. (Moscow: Patriia, 2007); Dzidzoev, Ot soiuza 
ob˝edinennykh gortsev Severnogo Kavkaza, 22–64.
39 S. A. Kondratov, ed., Revoliutsiia i grazhdanskaia voina v Rossii v 1917–1923: Entsiklopediia, 
4 vols. (Moscow: Terra, 2008), 4:62–63, 205, 420.
40 Dzidzoev, Ot soiuza ob˝edinennykh gortsev Severnogo Kavkaza, 109–11.
41 I. V. Stalin, “Report on Soviet Autonomy for the Terek Region and Concluding Remarks 
during the Congress of the Peoples of the Terek Region, 17 November 1920,” in Stalin, Works 
(Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1953), 4:412–20. 
42 I. V. Stalin, “Declaration on Soviet Autonomy for Dagestan and Concluding Remarks 
during the Congress of the Peoples of Dagestan, 13 November 1920,” in ibid., 4:407–11 
(reference to Gotsinskii on 410).
43 V. O. Bobrovnikov and I. L. Babich, eds., Severnyi Kavkaz v sostave Rossiiskoi imperii 
(Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2007), 191–94.
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those “mullahs” who had shown themselves to be “active revolutionaries and 
advocates of the interests of the working masses.”44 This seemingly tolerant 
attitude vis-à-vis Muslims and their institutions was supported by later 
directives from the Moscow central government, such as the one issued by the 
People’s Commissariat for Nationality Affairs on 16 December 1922, urging 
local authorities to refrain from using repressive methods against members of 
the Islamic clergy and to allow preaching of “religious dogmas” in mosques 
and private homes.45
If Dagestan survived as a separate administrative entity, the Soviet 
Mountain Republic was soon dissolved. Not only were relations among the 
different ethnic groups often fraught with tension (conflict was especially 
fierce between the Ingush and the Ossetes, as well as the Balkars and the 
Kabardians), but once the Red Army had invaded Georgia in February 
1921, defeating the bulk of Gotsinskii’s armed forces a few months later, an 
important rationale for the creation of this republic ceased to exist, as Stalin 
himself acknowledged.46 Already in May 1921, the leader of the Kabardian 
district, Betal Kalmykov, openly argued that his territory should secede from 
the Soviet Mountain Republic, and Moscow granted Kabarda the status of 
an autonomous region in September 1921.47 During 1922, the Karachai, 
Balkar, and Chechen autonomous regions were created, and by July 1924, 
the Mountain Republic was finally dissolved when the Ingush and Ossetes 
separated into two distinct autonomous regions.48 If Kabarda’s split from 
the Mountain Republic was largely initiated from below, however, the same 
cannot be said of the developments that led to the formation of a Chechen 
autonomous region. 
Autonomy for the Chechens
Initially, the creation of an autonomous Chechen region did not seem to be on 
anybody’s agenda. Chechnya was mostly rural, and it did not have a single city 
or industry of its own that might have served as a vehicle for modernization. 
For its economic development, the region relied largely on its links to Groznyi, 
a booming industrial city with some 23,000 workers, and the payments 
44 Daudov, Gorskaia ASSR, 53–54.
45 In Gatagova et al., TsK RKP(b)–VKP(b) i natsional´nyi vopros, 90.
46 Daudov, Gorskaia ASSR, 171.
47 Ibid., 165, 173.
48 At this point, the two cities Vladikavkaz and Groznyi, as well as the Sunzha district (okrug) 
of the Cossacks, remained separate administrative units. They were included into North Ossetia 
and Chechnya respectively only in 1928. During the early Soviet period, the North Caucasus 
region saw many more territorial-administrative changes (Tsutsiev, Atlas etnopoliticheskoi istorii 
Kavkaza, 61–78).
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received from the Groznyi oil company, Grozneft´.49 Accordingly, the notion 
that Chechnya might exist as a separate autonomous territory seemed rather 
far-fetched. Unlike Kalmykov, who pled for Kabardian territorial autonomy, 
El´darkhanov did not approach the central Soviet government with demands 
for a separate Chechen autonomous region. 
The creation of an autonomous Chechen region does not seem to have 
figured high in the minds of leading Bolsheviks either, at first. Other questions 
were more pressing, notably how to stop the rise of what was generally labeled 
“banditry” (banditizm). Karl Lander, who then represented the secret police 
in the North Caucasus, reported in February 1922 that among the mountain 
peoples, “like the Chechens, the Kabardians, and a part of the Karachai 
people,” who “hitherto [had been] well-disposed” toward them unrest was 
growing, and that the Chechens had started to carry out ambushes against 
the oil installations close to Groznyi, “which [had] not [been] the case until 
now.”50 This was all the more disconcerting to the author of the report because 
he linked the domestic with an international situation that was still perceived 
as threatening.51
To Lander, it was not obvious why the creation of autonomous regions 
should contribute to the stabilization of the region. Lander charged that the 
projects of “autonomists of the Soviet type,” among whom he specifically 
counted Betal Kalmykov and Grigorii Ordzhonikidze, played into the hands 
of counterrevolutionary forces working to split off the Caucasus from Russia.52 
Instead, Lander proposed that all Cossacks be evacuated (tens of thousands 
had already been deported after the end of the war as punishment for their 
collaboration with the Whites).53 The deportation of the Cossacks would 
not only allow Soviet rulers to rid themselves of a hostile segment of the 
population but would also satisfy the territorial demands of the Chechens, 
Lander argued. To suppress the influence of counterrevolutionary forces 
49 Daudov, Gorskaia ASSR, 187. 
50 Lander, Report to the CC RCP(b) [before 11 February 1922], in Gatagova et al., TsK 
RKP(b)–VKP(b) i natsional´nyi vopros, 60–64, 61.
51 Ibid., 64.
52 Ordzhonikidze was a leading figure in the Caucasus during the Civil War. In April 1918, 
Lenin appointed him temporary extraordinary commissar (Vremennyi chrezvychainyi 
komissar) for southern Russia. In February 1922, he was appointed first secretary of the South 
Caucasus Regional Committee of the RCP(b). 
53 The Bolshevik leadership in the spring of 1920 ordered the resettlement of some 
25,000 Cossacks, roughly one-tenth of the entire Cossack population of the Terek region 
(E. F. Zhupikova, “Povstanskoe dvizhenie na Severnom Kavkaze v 1920–1925 godakh,” in 
Akademiia istoricheskikh nauk: Sbornik trudov (Moscow: Akademiia istoricheskikh nauk, 
2007), 1:114–319, 156–57. 
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effectively, he also recommended that the adjacent territories of the region be 
placed under direct military control.54
The Soviet leadership did not follow Lander’s recommendations. For the 
time being, there would be no further large-scale deportations of Cossacks.55 
Yet the situation in Chechnya continued to deteriorate at this time. 
According to a report compiled by Mikoian in October 1922, ambushes by 
Chechens were no longer directed against only Cossack settlements, as they 
had frequently been in the past. Chechens increasingly attacked the railway, 
killed members of the Red Army, and intensified their attacks on Groznyi oil 
production sites.56 Frequently, ambushes were abetted by the very members 
of local militias tasked by the government of the Soviet Mountain Republic 
with fighting banditry.57 
In his report of October 1922, Mikoian for the first time advocated 
military action in response to this situation. A large-scale military action 
was, according to Mikoian, an indispensable requirement for a return to 
normality in Chechnya.58 His report stipulated other measures as well, such 
as reconsidering the tax in kind (prodnalog), which was seen as one of the key 
reasons for the widespread sense of grievance among the population.59 The 
aim of such military action was not only to smash the armed bands but also 
to disarm the male population. Mikoian estimated that the local population 
in Chechnya and Ingushetia still owned around 70,000 rifles.60 
The disarmament of Chechnya would indeed take place, but not until 
about three years later. For the time being, the party leaders decided to follow 
a different course. Based on Mikoian’s report, the situation in the Soviet 
Mountain Republic was discussed during a meeting of the Organizational 
54 Gatagova et al., TsK RKP(b)–VKP(b) i natsional´nyi vopros, 63.
55 On the contrary, in the 1920s, relations between Soviet power and the Cossacks gradually 
normalized, and it was probably Mikoian in particular who responded to the concerns of 
the Cossack population and acted as their advocate. See A. I. Mikoian, report to Molotov 
[late 1924], Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial´no-politicheskoi istorii (RGASPI) f. 17, 
op. 67, d. 172, ll. 73–78; Mikoian, Tak bylo: Razmyshleniia o minuvshem (Moscow: Vagrius, 
1999), 224–26. See also Mikoian, unpublished notes, 1971, RGASPI f. 84, op. 3, d. 120, ll. 
53–61. 
56 A. I. Mikoian, report to CC RCP(b), 1 October 1922, in Gatagova et al., TsK RKP(b)– 
VKP(b) i natsional´nyi vopros, 84–87, 85.
57 Telegram from the provincial committee (gubernskii komitet ) to CC RCP(b) on Chechen 
robberies, 14–27 October 1922, in ibid., 87–88.
58 Mikoian, report to CC RCP(b), 1 October 1922, 84–87.
59 The Bolsheviks had introduced this tax across the country as early as the spring of 1921 
as part of their New Economic Policy (NEP) to replace the even harsher War Communism 
measure of governmental confiscation of grain. 
60 Mikoian, report to CC RCP(b), 1 October 1922, 85.
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Bureau (Orgburo) in Moscow on 9 October 1922.61 Most likely, it was 
during this meeting that the Bolsheviks first considered the creation of an 
autonomous Chechen region. In his memoirs, Mikoian claims to have been 
the first to propose a separate national territory for the Chechens.62 In the 
minutes of the Orgburo for 9 October 1922, however, there is no hint that 
the idea came from Mikoian. There is only a reference to Stalin having raised 
the “new question regarding the possibility of giving Chechnya separate 
status as an autonomous region.”63 To evaluate the question, the bureau 
decided to form a commission. Along with Mikoian, its members included 
Voroshilov and Sergei Kirov, who was first secretary of the Azerbaijan Central 
Committee. Until the question of autonomy had been conclusively resolved, 
the Orgburo explicitly banned any repressive measures against Chechens.64
It is likely that Chechens themselves were consulted only after the 
meeting of 9 October 1922. Having conferred with the locals, on 22 
October the commission submitted a list of the 13-member future Chechen 
government, which was to be formed as a revkom.65 Besides El´darkhanov, 
who was appointed chairman, the government consisted of ten more 
Chechens—only three of them Communists (both non-Chechens were also 
Communists).66 Thus it is likely that the government included a substantial 
portion of Chechnya’s Communists at the time.67 The Orgburo accepted 
61 The Orgburo of the CC RCP(b) was created in 1919 and consisted of members of the 
Central Committee. As the leading board of the Party, its tasks were similar to those of the 
Secretariat of the Central Committee and the Politburo. The Orgburo existed until 1952, 
but its importance diminished. Some members of the Orgburo, among them Stalin, were 
intermittently members of all three boards. See John Löwenhardt, The Soviet Politburo, trans. 
Dymphna Clark (New York: St. Martin’s, 1982), 78–80. 
62 Supposedly, he first discussed the idea with Feliks Dzerzhinskii, founder of the Cheka, and 
then took the proposition to Stalin for approval (Mikoian, Tak bylo, 229).
63 Gatagova et al., TsK RKP(b)–VKP(b) i natsional´nyi vopros, 87 n. 9. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Initially, these institutions—some of which had already been set up during the Russian Civil 
War—were considered exceptional instruments of government for a period of transition, after 
which they were to be replaced with elected councils (soviets). Because of the difficulties in 
conducting regular elections for the councils, however, revkomy in Chechnya and other parts 
of the North Caucasus existed intermittently until the mid-1920s, sometimes simultaneously 
with regularly elected soviets (N. F. Bugai and D. Kh. Mekulov, Narody i vlast´: “Sotsialisticheskii 
eksperiment” (20-e gody) [Maikop: Meoty, 1994], 71).
66 Minutes of the commission of the CC RCP(b) on Chechnya’s separation from the Soviet 
Mountain Republic of 22 October 1922, in Gatagova et al., TsK RKP(b)–VKP(b) i natsional´nyi 
vopros, 88–89. 
67 Mikoian mentions that there was a grand total of ten Chechen Communists in Chechnya 
at the time (report to CC RCP(b), 1 October 1922, 84); El´darkhanov mentioned that there 
were “hardly any Communists“ in Chechnya in his remarks at the fourth session of the CC 
RCP(b), Moscow, 9–12 June 1923 (Tainy natsional´noi politiki TsK RKP, 169). 
744 JERONIM PEROVIć
the commission’s proposal. As per the decree of the All-Russian Central 
Executive Committee of 20 November 1922, Chechnya was separated from 
the Mountain Republic and given the status of an autonomous region on 30 
November 1922.68
How can this change of opinion among Bolshevik leaders be explained? 
Why did they refrain from military action? Based on the fact that Stalin himself 
promoted the creation of an autonomous Chechen region, this decision may 
reflect his basic ideas concerning the question of nationality and autonomy. 
The Chechens as a compact settlement community with about 290,000 
members—bound together by a shared language, territory, and economic and 
cultural lifestyle—more than matched the criteria for the establishment of an 
autonomous region.69 Furthermore, Stalin’s interest in the matter should also 
be considered against the background of an internal political power struggle. 
He may have regarded the case of Chechnya as another opportunity to increase 
the attractiveness of Soviet power, and thus of his own person as the head of 
the People’s Commissariat for Nationality Affairs. Against the background of 
his ambitions to power, this was not unimportant, as it constituted a central 
factor in the struggle against internal opponents such as Lev Trotskii, Grigorii 
Zinov´ev, Lev Kamenev, Nikolai Bukharin, or Aleksei Rykov. Without the 
support of non-Russians, not only might Stalin have failed to promote his 
concept of autonomy successfully, but he could even have been defeated in 
the internal struggle with his opponents.70
The particularly difficult situation in Chechnya, however, also appears to 
have greatly influenced deliberations about the granting of autonomy. Wishing 
to avoid the risk of alienating the population from Soviet power even more 
through a military operation, possibly provoking increased disturbances, the 
Bolsheviks preferred to hand over responsibility to the Chechens themselves. 
Accordingly, the granting of autonomy was bound to conditions. Item 7 of 
the commission’s 22 October 1922 report unambiguously demanded that the 
Chechen revkom take all necessary measures to stop “attacks by Chechens 
against members of the Red Army, industrial installations, [and] the railway 
lines.” Thus autonomy also meant that it would henceforth be possible 
clearly to assign responsibility for such incidents, because “for every breach 
68 Gatagova et al., TsK RKP(b)–VKP(b) i natsional´nyi vopros, 89 n. 2.
69 The figure of 290,000 is derived from the census of 1926 and includes over 90 percent of 
Chechens; the rest of the population was settled in neighboring territories, mostly in Dagestan 
(almost 7 percent). According to the 1926 census, there were 318,522 Chechens living in 
the USSR as a whole (http://demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/ussr_nac_26.php, accessed 6 February 
2013). See also N. F. Bugai and A. M. Gonov, Kavkaz: Narody v eshelonakh (20–60-e gody) 
(Moscow: INSAN, 1998), 58. 
70 Baberowski, Der Feind ist überall, 199. 
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of the order in autonomous Chechnya,” as the report stated, “responsibility 
should lie with the Chechen revkom.”71 In that way, the Bolsheviks removed 
themselves from the firing line while retaining the option to blame the 
revkom in case of difficulties. 
Hardly anybody familiar with the situation in Chechnya anticipated 
that the revkom under El´darkhanov might quickly succeed in stabilizing 
the situation on its own, thus creating the requirement for regular elections 
to soviets. In Chechen society, allegiances were still first and foremost bound 
to the family and the respective clans and village communities, and beyond 
that, to charismatic Muslim leaders. As an ethnic Chechen, El´darkhanov 
may well have enjoyed sympathy among the population, but this did not 
yet grant him the authority necessary to enforce new notions of state order. 
Such authority could not be attained without the inclusion of representatives 
from Chechen society. When a Soviet delegation departed for Urus-Martan 
in January 1923 to deliver Moscow’s decision concerning the creation of an 
autonomous Chechen region, it was precisely on this basis that the Bolsheviks 
proposed that one of the most influential figures at the time, Ali Mitaev, 
should become a member of the new Chechen government. 
The Ali Mitaev Phenomenon 
Mitaev, who showed up at the meeting in Urus-Matan with a stately escort of 
armed men on horseback, must have made a grand impression on the Soviet 
delegates. In his letter to Stalin, Voroshilov calls him a “devilishly smart and 
crafty” man.72 On the evening after the meeting ended, the Soviet delegates 
asked El´darkhanov to establish contact with Mitaev through local Chechens 
and invite him to talks.73 According to Mikoian’s detailed description of this 
meeting, Mitaev, who arrived with two heavily armed bodyguards, was a 
“well-proportioned [man], in Chechen dress, armed with a dagger [kinzhal´ ], 
a saber [shashka] and a pistol [mauser].”74 As he apparently did not speak any 
Russian, El´darkhanov served as translator. After a long discussion, the Soviet 
delegates offered to make Mitaev a regular member of the revkom, a proposal 
to which the young Chechen agreed.75 On 12 April 1923, the leaders in 
Moscow gave their blessing, and Mitaev was officially appointed a member of 
the Chechen government and put in charge of guarding trains and stations 
from ambushes. Henceforth, a 100-strong detachment of his murids (Arab. 
71 Gatagova et al., TsK RKP(b)–VKP(b) i natsional´nyi vopros, 89.
72 Ibid.
73 Mikoian, “Iz vospominanii,” 53.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
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murīd, literally “committed one,” a member of a tariqa, a Sufi brotherhood) 
was paid by the Soviet government to fulfill this task.76 
Ali Mitaev had been born in the settlement of Avtury in what was later 
the Shali district, probably around 1891.77 He went to primary school in 
Groznyi, then studied at an Islamic institution, where he was trained as a 
cleric. Besides Chechen and Arabic, he may have had some knowledge of 
Russian, yet the sources differ as to his proficiency in this language.78 
Ali came from an influential Chechen family. His father was none other 
than the well-known Sheikh Bamat Girei Khadzhi Mitaev (1838?–1914), an 
adherent of the famous Chechen sheikh Kunta-Khadzhi, the founder of the 
Sufi brotherhood of the Qadiriyya in Chechnya. After Kunta-Khadzhi’s death 
in Russian exile in 1867, Bamat Girei Khadzhi rose to become one of the 
most important leaders of the Qadiriyya. He was revered as a “holy man,” and 
had a large group of murid followers.79 In 1912, the tsarist administration, 
as a punishment for the sheik’s alleged support of the notorious Chechen 
76 According to El´darkhanov, 98 persons were appointed to guard the railroad (“Report on 
the Economic and Socio-Political Situation, 25 August 1923,” in Vainakhi i imperskaia vlast’´ 
Problema Chechni i Ingushetii vo vnutrennei politike Rossii i SSSR (nachalo XIX–seredina XX v.), 
ed. V. A. Kozlov et al. [Moscow: Rosspen, 2011], 482–503, here 484). 
77 Contemporary sources offer different birth dates for Mitaev, but the early 1890s seem most 
plausible. A 1911 document commissioned by the tsarist administration of the Terek region 
contains an entry on Ali’s father, Sheikh Bamat Girei Khadzhi, and lists his two sons Ali and 
Umar. According to this source, Ali was 20 years old at that time and already married to 
his wife Nabi. Omar was 16 and unmarried (Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii 
[GARF] f. 102, op. 146, d. 635–2, ll. 91–93, 92 ob.). Later reports provide different dates. 
The North Caucasus prosecutors’ document of 24 September 1924 justifying Mitaev’s arrest 
states that Mitaev was 36 when arrested, thus born in 1888 (RGASPI f. 65, op. 1, d. 89, ll. 
116–21 ob., here l. 116). In his biography of Mitaev, Zaurbekov indicates 1887 as Mitaev’s 
birth year, drawing on statements from persons close to him and his family: M. D. Zaurbekov, 
Sheikh Ali Mitaev: Patriot, mirotvorets, politik, genii. Etalon spravedlivosti i chesti (Groznyi: Zori 
Islama, 2008), 48. 
78 The Chechen historian Musa Geshaev claims Mitaev was “proficient” in Chechen, Arabic, 
and Russian, and that he was a distinguished expert in philosophy, religion, history, and 
politics (Znamenitye chechentsy: Istoricheskie ocherki, 4 vols. [Moscow: Musaizdat, 2005], 
2: 500. Contemporary observers disagree: Mikoian wrote on several occasions that Mitaev 
spoke little or no Russian (RGASPI f. 84, op. 3, d. 117, l. 42; Mikoian, “Iz vospominanii,” 
53). Budennyi concurs, stating in his memoirs that they required the services of a translator 
(presumably El´darkhanov) during the talks with Mitaev in Urus-Martan (Proidennyi put´, 
311). The Communist Aleksandr Shliapnikov confirmed that Mitaev spoke Chechen but 
makes no mention of Russian (“Za khlebom i neft´iu,” Voprosy istorii, no. 12 [2002]: 94–119, 
here 106). 
79 Kozlov et al., Vainakhi i imperskaia vlast´, 243–44; Zaurbekov, Sheikh Ali Mitaev, 15, 
26–27, 38. Bamat Girei Khadzhi was married to three women, owned a large amount of real 
estate and a textile manufactory, which the officials estimated to be worth 8,000 rubles (report 
commissioned by the tsarist administration of the Terek region, 10 February 1912, GARF f. 
102, op. 146, d. 635–2, ll. 91–93). 
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bandit Abrek Zelimkhan, exiled him and six other Chechen sheikhs to inner 
Russia.80 When Bamat Girei Khadzhi died in exile in Kaluga in 1914, his 
firstborn son, Ali, took over his role.81 Ali not only inherited his father’s murids 
but apparently reinvigorated his followers.82 In his district, he appeared as a 
patron of education by having a school built in his hometown of Avtury in 
1913.83 It was in the parts of Chechnya where Mitaev wielded most influence 
(mostly in the Shali and Vedeno districts) that people regarded him as a 
benefactor who “paid out of his own pocket for schools to be built in the 
villages” and constructed “bridges for passage and journey” to “help the poor 
and backward citizens.”84 
In his youth, Ali witnessed the repressive policy of Cossack rule. 
According to the autobiographical records that he is alleged to have written 
in prison from 1924 to 1925, he was an eyewitness to a massacre of Chechens 
in Gudermes in 1909 committed by Lieutenant General Verbitskii and his 
Cossacks.85 It was his father’s deportation in 1912, however, which must 
have left the deepest impression and shaped his negative view of tsarist rule. 
After the overthrow of the tsarist regime, Mitaev would refer to this event in 
public speeches.86 He also brought it up during his discussions with the Soviet 
delegates in Urus-Martan.87 
80 Zaurbekov, Sheikh Ali Mitaev, 25–26.
81 Ibid., 38, 89. 
82 Aleksei Kosterin reported that Ali Mitaev’s followers numbered some 10,000 (“Po Chechne 
[putevye nabroski]: U miuridov v gostiakh,” in Pereval [Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel´stvo, 
1924], 2:288–306, here 288. The same figure later reappeared in other sources.
83 Arkhivnoe upravlenie Pravitel´stva Chechenskoi Respubliki (AUP ChR) f. 236, op. 1, d. 
343, ll. 1–3.
84 “Minutes of the Village Soviet of the Settlement Tsatsan-Iurt, 27 April 1925,” AUP ChR f. 
r-1206, op. 1ks, d. 31, ll. 44–45, 44.
85 Arkhiv KGB Chechenskoi Respubliki f. 4971, 2:268, quoted in Zaurbekov, Sheikh Ali 
Mitaev, 50. The head of the Department of Scientific Research of the Chechen archive stated 
that Mitaev’s notes were lost when the contents of the KGB archive—and of other archives 
as well—were destroyed during the wars of the 1990s (personal communication from A. I. 
Dukhaev, 5 March 2012). Zaurbekov’s claims cannot, therefore, be verified. According to his 
own account, he was able to view the document before 1994, when the first Chechen War 
began (personal communication from M. D. Zaurbekov, 6 March 2012). His book remains 
the only source for Mitaev’s alleged autobiography. 
86 Shliapnikov recalled that during the meeting of the peoples of the Terek region, organized 
by the Bolsheviks and held from 25 January to 2 February 1918 in Mozdok, Mitaev gave a 
speech saying that “his father had suffered for his beliefs and was heavily punished for it by the 
Russian government” (“Za khlebom i neft´iu,” 110–11).
87 During their negotiations, Mitaev allegedly complained about the behavior of the Soviet 
government and compared it to the treatment of his father by the tsarist regime (Mikoian, “Iz 
vospominanii,” 53).
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It was thus not surprising that during the Russian Civil War, the White 
generals, as representatives of the old regime, found in Mitaev a bitter enemy. 
While Soviet historiography generally tends to play down or conceal the role 
of the Muslim leaders, North Caucasian historians have sought to revise this 
perception as far as possible.88 For example, Mitaev’s biographer Maskhud 
Zaurbekov claims that Mitaev played a far more important role than those 
figures mentioned in Soviet historiography, such as the Communist Nikolai 
Gikalo (1897–1938), a Russian native of the Caucasus who was commander 
of the Red Army in the Terek region during the Civil War, or Aslanbek 
Sheripov (1897–1919), a member of the secular Chechen intelligentsia whom 
Soviet historiography has commonly portrayed as the “first Communist” of 
Chechnya.89
However, the comparison between Mitaev and Gikalo drawn by 
Zaurbekov is problematic insofar as Mitaev’s interests were always focused 
on local issues and aimed at defending the settlements he controlled in the 
areas where he was influential.90 After Denikin’s army arrived and full-fledged 
war broke out, Mitaev, like many other Chechen leaders, opposed Denikin in 
the areas he controlled, but he showed little interest in alliances that did not 
align with his local interests.91 In his home district, however, it was Mitaev 
who during the turmoil of the war embodied the power that provided a 
88 I. Razgon was the most prominent historian of the early Soviet period on the Civil 
War in the North Caucasus. He barely mentioned the role of religious figures, consistently 
maintaining that the “insurrection in the mountains of the Caucasus against Denikin was 
led by the Caucasus Regional Committee of the RKP(b)” (“Gikalovtsy,” Bor´ba klassov, no. 6 
[1936]: 45–56, here 52). 
89 O. M. Morozova, “Nikolai Fedorovich Gikalo,” Voprosy istorii, no. 9 (2011): 37–57. 
On Sheripov, see Zaurbekov, Sheikh Ali Mitaev, 49. See also the first edition of the Soviet 
encyclopedia of 1934: Bol´shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia (Moscow: Sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 
1934), 61:534. For an early Soviet biography on Sheripov, see Efrem Eshba, Aslanbek Sheripov: 
Opyt kharakteristiki, lichnosti i deiatel´nosti A. Sheripova v sviazi s narodno-revolutsionnym 
dvizheniem v Chechne. K desiatiletiiu Oktiabr´skoi revoliutsii, 2nd rev. ed. (Groznyi: Serlo, 
1929). 
90 In fact, as early as the spring of 1917, Mitaev was organizing armed units to fight banditry 
(Muzaev, Soiuz gortsev, 107).
91 Boris M. Kuznetsov, an officer of the former Russian Empire who was an opponent of 
the Bolsheviks, corroborates this view. He mentions Mitaev briefly when writing about the 
situation in the North Caucasus in 1918: “The only person who could have been of been of help 
in our struggle against the Bolsheviks was Ali Mitaev, a Chechen, who wielded considerable 
influence in Chechnya. However, the Chechens at this time were mostly occupied with their 
own affairs. They settled their accounts with the Terek Cossacks and plundered everybody 
whom they had not yet plundered” (1918 god v Dagestane: Grazhdanskaia voina [New York: 
Voennyi vestnik, 1959], 19).
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“minimum of organization,” as stated in a report of the White forces on the 
situation in the North Caucasus from the beginning of 1919.92 
Ali Mitaev was an important political figure in Chechnya after the 
February 1917 Revolution. He was a member of the Chechen National 
Council elected in March 1917; he was open to new socialist ideas and close 
to similarly minded members of the council. These included the Russian-
educated Tashtemir El´darkhanov, a teacher by training, who came from a 
wealthy Chechen family and was a member of the Muslim faction of the 
Terek region in the First and Second Dumas in 1906–7; Akhmad Mutushev 
(1879–1943), a lawyer and the first elected head of the Chechen National 
Council; and Abdul-Medzhid (Tapa) Chermoev (1882–1936/37), a Chechen 
who made a fortune in the Groznyi oil business and became president of the 
Union of United Mountaineers of the North Caucasus and Dagestan and 
later the Mountain Republic.93 Mitaev’s receptiveness to socialist thought is 
confirmed by a contemporary eyewitness, Aleksandr Shliapnikov, who was 
sent by the Soviet government to the North Caucasus in 1918 in his capacity 
as commissar for labor. Shliapnikov portrays Mitaev, whom he encountered 
during the session of the peoples of the Terek region held from 25 January 
to 2 February 1918 in Mozdok, as a “convinced socialist” who held a “fiery 
speech” in favor of the revolutionary cause and was ready to stand up “with a 
whip in his hand” against those Chechen “fanatics” who wanted to do away 
with the Soviet delegates during the meeting.94 
Probably as early as the beginning of 1920, discord arose between Mitaev 
and Gikalo, then the most important representative of the Bolsheviks in 
Chechnya.95 According to Zaurbekov, Mitaev had organized a large meeting 
of the Chechen people in Avtury at the end of March 1920 without informing 
Gikalo. This meeting, a normal event in Chechen political and social life, 
was viewed as a provocation by Gikalo. At another meeting convoked by 
the Bolsheviks in Groznyi a few days later, Gikalo openly accused Mitaev 
of being a counterrevolutionary. In his book, Zaurbekov quotes letters in 
which Mitaev not only vehemently contradicts Gikalo’s accusations and casts 
himself as a staunch supporter of Soviet power but also questions Gikalo’s 
92 Report, 24 January 1919, in Vainakhi i imperskaia vlast´, 282–94, here 288.
93 Isa Shaipov, Tashtemir El´darkhanov (Groznyi: Checheno-ingushskoe knizhnoe izdatel´stvo, 
1960); Muzaev, Soiuz gortsev, 448–49; Timur Muzaev, “Tapa Čermoev,” Nakhskii zhurnal 
“Teptar,” 1 November 2007 (https://archive.is/zw9ep, accessed 4 February 2014). 
94 Shliapnikov, “Za khlebom i neft´iu,” 108–11.
95 In January 1920, Gikalo was appointed commander of the Terek group of the Red Army 
(Morozova, “Nikolai Fedorovich Gikalo,” 42). 
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performance in defending Chechnya during Denikin’s rule in 1919.96 The 
Chechen historian’s evidence is shaky (often his citations lack specific archival 
references, or he refers to recollections of contemporary witnesses), yet his 
statements largely concur with the impressions that Voroshilov conveyed of 
his meeting with Mitaev in January 1923. Thus, according to Voroshilov, 
Mitaev himself asked the Bolshevik delegates to take steps as soon as possible 
to rehabilitate him completely. In doing so, he “swore to all prophets, that 
he had been defamed in the eyes of Soviet power,” which might indicate a 
quarrel between himself and Gikalo.97
In any case, after this rift in 1920, cooperation between Mitaev and the 
Bolsheviks broke down, a situation that must have been unsettling for the 
state security services, which feared that important political and religious 
leaders such as Ali Mitaev might pursue more than just local interests. This 
is clear from a letter sent to Stalin in early 1923 by a certain Gorodetskii, 
head of the Department for the Fight against Banditry within the All-
Russian Central Executive Committee. It stated that Mitaev had organized 
another large meeting of about 1,000 people in September 1922. According 
to the correspondent, the basic theme discussed during the meeting was 
“Chechnya’s secession [from Russia] and its orientation toward Turkey.”98 It 
is unclear whether this evaluation indeed reflected Mitaev’s political agenda 
or rather the writer’s fears. People like Mitaev must have been suspect in 
the eyes of outsiders if only for their Muslim beliefs. Since large gatherings 
of Chechens were often accompanied by mass prayers in the form of the 
zikr, which included loud singing and rhythmic dancing, they were often 
deemed compelling evidence of the Chechens’ fanatical mindset or pan-
Islamic orientation, or even of preparations for ghazawat, a holy war against 
infidels.99 
The mere fact that people like Mitaev could carry out mass demonstrations 
unhindered by the Soviet government must itself have unsettled the 
Bolsheviks. Subsequently, Mitaev increasingly came into the sights of the 
secret police, who began to observe him as early as December 1922 under 
the code name “Tikhii” (quiet). Apparently, the secret investigation of 
96 Zaurbekov, Sheikh Ali Mitaev, 70–76. New research indicates that the Bolsheviks only 
played a minor role during 1919, when Denikin’s Army of Volunteers dominated the North 
Caucasus. Yet Mitaev’s praise of Chechen resistance also needs to be treated with some care. 
After the Chechens suffered severe losses against Denikin’s troops, many changed sides and 
allied with the Whites (Morozova, “Nikolai Fedorovich Gikalo,” 40–41). 
97 Gatagova et al., TsK RKP(b)–VKP(b) i natsional´nyi vopros, 95.
98 Quoted in Bugai, Narody i vlast´, 68–69. 
99 On this subject, see Sergei Mironov, head of the Eastern Department of the North Caucasus 
GPU, “Report” [before 21 April 1923], RGASPI f. 17, op. 84, d. 588, ll. 33–34.
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Mitaev was opened in response to a note by the military commissioner of 
the 28th Mountain Division, a certain Zhivin, who claimed that Mitaev was 
the “leader of the sharia and the sharia movement” in Chechnya and the 
“richest, most authoritarian, and most popular of all Chechens.”100 When 
Mitaev became a member of the revkom, the local branch of the secret police 
was naturally displeased. It should come as no surprise that the members of 
this organization later did everything in their power to bring about Mitaev’s 
downfall. 
Under Observation by the Secret Police
Around 21 April 1923, shortly after Mitaev’s official appointment to the 
Chechen revkom, a report from Sergei Mironov reached the Southeastern 
Bureau of the GPU in Rostov-on-Don. Mironov was the head of the GPU’s 
Eastern Department. Contrary to Voroshilov’s unequivocal statement in his 
letter to Stalin—that it was illusory to believe the situation in Chechnya could 
be improved without the help of the clergy—Mironov argued that the clergy 
must be sidelined. The “anarchy,” the “increase of banditry and religious zeal” 
that he claimed to have observed in Chechnya could be fought successfully 
only by a determined effort to weaken sharia and its followers.101 To win 
over the impoverished peasant classes in the mountain areas, land should be 
allocated to them, he argued. All these measures should be implemented not 
by the current Chechen government but by the Communist Party, which 
Mironov suggested should be built around a vaguely defined “small group 
of national Communists” who were to replace El´darkhanov and his close 
associates as soon as possible.102 
Mironov did not provide concrete names as to who exactly was to replace 
El´darkhanov. Yet after the suppression of Gotsinskii’s rebellion, Mironov 
must have felt confident enough to push for radical change, to remove any 
figures or groups he considered a potential danger to the establishment of 
Soviet power. He alluded to such a thing, at least, in his report, where he 
sought to achieve maximum effect: “Peace in the entire Caucasus depends 
on peace in Chechnya, and the increase in religiosity observed by us … is 
extremely dangerous and indicates a tendency, vindicated by history, that 
any armed rising of the mountain peoples is preceded by a strong surge of 
religious fervor.”103 Ali Mitaev epitomized this negatively perceived situation. 
Mironov claimed that Mitaev had joined forces with sheikhs Gotsinskii, Emin 
100 RGASPI f. 65, op. 1, d. 142, l. 26.
101 “Report” [before 21 April 1923], ll. 33–34. 
102 Ibid., l. 33 ob.
103 Ibid., l. 34.
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Ansaltinskii, and Bilo Khadzhi to form a kind of “higher sharia council,” 
which aimed at nothing less than the preparation of a “holy war” against 
Soviet power.104 
The report achieved its desired effect. On the same day that Mironov’s 
letter reached Rostov-on-Don, the person in charge, Iakob Peters, forwarded 
the letter to the Central Committee, attention Stalin.105 Under the 
supervision of Mironov and Efim Evdokimov, the authorized representative 
(polnomochnyi predstavitel´ ) of the GPU in the North Caucasus, the secret 
police scrupulously pursued its prosecution of Ali Mitaev and compiled 
report after report addressed to the regional party headquarters in Rostov-on-
Don. In doing so, the secret police did not limit itself to general accusations 
but took great pains to substantiate these with detailed information. After all, 
arguing for Mitaev’s exclusion meant going against the decision just taken by 
the Southeastern Bureau and approved by Moscow. 
Mironov and his team essentially followed two lines of argument. On the 
one hand, they sought to prove that Mitaev’s appointment to the revkom had 
been a mistake, since it had failed to stabilize the situation. One GPU report 
refers to “40 cases of bandit attacks on industrial compounds, the railroad, 
and members of the Red Army,” with all these attacks ostensibly “political 
in nature.”106 Later, the secret police even claimed that Mitaev’s murids 
themselves had taken part in the attacks.107 On the other hand, the secret 
police tried to prove that Mitaev was organizing a rebellion against Soviet 
power and was in contact with other counterrevolutionary forces. The reports 
mention Gotsinskii, whom Mitaev was supposed to have met in person “on 
9 or 10 March 1923.”108 They also note ties to Georgian Prince Kakutsa 
Chelokaev (or Cholokashvili, 1888–1930), a former colonel in the tsarist 
army who operated with his group of rebels near the border with Chechnya. 
Furthermore, the secret police claimed that Mitaev maintained relations with 
General Rogoshin, the leader of a group of Cossack rebels, as well as with 
followers of the pan-Islamic party Ittihad Islam (Islam United), alongside 
Turkish and other foreign agents. In all these schemes, the secret police officers 
claimed, Mitaev was only waiting for the right moment, when the “external 
104 Ibid., l. 33.
105 Stalin’s reaction to this letter is not recorded (Gatagova et al., TsK RKP(b)–VKP(b) i 
natsional´nyi vopros, 113 n. 6).
106 N. M. Peremyshlennikova and G. N. Sevost´ianov, eds., “Sovershenno sekretno”: Lubianka–
Stalinu o polozhenii v strane (1922–1934), 1, pt. 2: 1922–1923 (Moscow: Institut rossiiskoi 
istorii RAN, 2001), 973.
107 RGASPI f. 65, op. 1, d. 142, ll. 13–17.
108 Ibid., l. 26.
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front” against the USSR had been formed, to strike.109 Regarding the allegedly 
close ties between Mitaev and Gotsinskii, Mironov and Evdokimov tried to 
offer proof in the form of supposedly original copies of their correspondence, 
mentioning mutual support and supplies of weapons.110 
What corroborating evidence did third parties offer? The charges of 
ambushes on the railroad and industrial compounds certainly appear to 
have been exaggerated. In his memoirs, Mikoian himself admitted that 
Mitaev’s appointment to the revkom brought about a “certain pacification” 
of Chechnya.111 This is confirmed by other parties directly involved. For 
example, R. N. Sokolov, representative of the military commissioner’s office 
in Chechnya, stated in one of his reports in July 1923 that the situation 
had improved considerably and “banditry had decreased to a minimum” 
after Mitaev’s integration into the revkom.112 The native Georgian secretary 
of the Chechen division of the Orgburo, Asnarashvili, concurred with 
the assessment that after Mitaev’s appointment, assaults on railroads were 
“quickly liquidated.”113
While Sokolov did not mention the alleged ties between Mitaev and 
Gotsinskii at all, Asnarashvili described them in great detail. He must have 
read Mironov’s report, because in his letter he agreed with him about the severe 
danger of a possible union of “these two forces, the plains and the mountains.” 
He conceded that Mitaev was a “most correct and faultless” person, who 
primarily fulfilled his “duties toward the state.” For example, he had delivered 
the “full amount of tax in kind five months ago.” Asnarashvili claimed that 
the picture of the “outwardly honest citizen” was deceptive, however, because 
Mitaev was “slippery as a snake,” trying to use his new position in the revkom 
to increase his influence and to make El´darkhanov dependent on him.114 In 
this latter aim, Sokolov asserted, Mitaev had largely succeeded. While Mitaev—
under constant observation by the secret police—reportedly acted carefully and 
had supposedly even succeeded in persuading Gotsinskii to temporarily leave 
Chechnya, Asnarashvili did not believe Mitaev had dissociated himself from 
109 Ibid., ll. 26–33; Peremyshlennikova and Sevost´ianov, “Sovershenno sekretno,” 1, pt. 2:973, 
979; N. M. Peremyshlennikova and G. N. Sevost´ianov et al., eds., “Sovershenno sekretno”: 
Lubianka–Stalinu o polozhenii v strane (1922–1934), 2: 1924 (Moscow: Institut rossiiskoi 
istorii RAN, 2001), 33.
110 Russian translations of these letters from Arabic can be found in RGASPI f. 65, op. 1, d. 
142, ll. 18–19.
111 Mikoian, “Iz vospominanii,” 54.
112 Sokolov, “Report on Chechnya” [before 20 July 1923], in Vainakhi i imperskaia vlast´, 
133–35, here 134. 
113 Asnarashvili to Mikoian, ca. 22 October 1923, RGASPI f. 17, op. 84, d. 538, ll. 59–65, 
here l. 62. 
114 Ibid., l. 63.
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Gotsinskii. Such dissociation was, according to Asnarashvili, disproven not 
only by the frequent visits by Gotsinskii’s followers to Mitaev, but also by the 
fact that Mitaev, like his father before him, was a follower of pan-Islamic ideas, 
which Gotsinskii fundamentally shared.115 Sokolov and Asnarashvili agreed 
with Mironov insofar as both called for Mitaev’s removal. Unlike Mironov, 
however, they advocated a different approach: strengthening El´darkhanov and 
the Chechen revkom.116 Until a new generation of “Chechen intelligentsia” 
had been educated in Soviet schools, Asnarashvili argued, it was imperative to 
support El´darkhanov, to whom for the moment there was no alternative, and 
to redirect him to his “former course.”117
It is impossible to determine whether Mitaev was actually cultivating 
contacts with anti-Soviet rebel groups and how close these may have been. 
Concerning his relationship with Gotsinskii, he was probably careful enough 
to avoid direct contact, knowing that he was watched closely by the state’s 
security organs. Asnarashvili was not alone in claiming that Gotsinskii might 
have resided outside Chechnya, perhaps in Azerbaijan, from the summer of 
1923 at the latest.118 At the same time, one cannot exclude the possibility that 
Mitaev met with persons close to Gotsinskii or other groups hostile to Soviet 
power. Later, during interrogation in prison, Mitaev categorically denied any 
contacts with Georgian rebel leaders.119 Nonetheless, Georgian sources report 
that such contact did take place during the summer of 1923.120 
If Mitaev indeed received guests who were openly opposed to the 
Bolsheviks, then this could be an indication that he was hedging his 
bets. Aware of the fragility of his ties with the Soviet state and its security 
organs, he may have felt it best to cultivate relations with other parties who 
115 Ibid., l. 64.
116 Ibid., ll. 13–14, 64. 
117 Ibid., ll. 63–64.
118 Bol´shakov, secretary of Groznyi’s RCP(b) committee, closed letter (zakrytoe pis´mo) to his 
comrades (with a copy to Lazar´ Kaganovich, then head of the organizational department of 
the secretary of the CC), 25 July 1923, RGASPI f. 17, op. 67, d. 63, ll. 32–36, here ll. 34–35.
119 North Caucasus prosecutors’ decision on the Mitaev case, 24 September 1924, RGASPI f. 
65, op. 1, d. 89, ll. 116–21 ob., here 119. 
120 N. G. Dzhavakhishvili, “Bor´ba za svobodu Kavkaza: Iz istorii voenno-politicheskogo 
sotrudnichestva gruzin i severokavkaztsev v pervoi polovine XX veka,” Prometheus, no. 8 
(2011): 35–49, here 47–49 (http://chechen.org/archives/158, accessed 10 June 2013); 
Dzhavakhishvili, “Bor´ba za svobodu Kavkaza: Iz istorii voenno-politicheskogo sotrudnichestva 
gruzin i severokavkaztsev v pervoi polovine XX veka. Okonchanie,” Prometheus, no. 9 (2011) 
(http://chechen.org/archives/162, accessed 10 June 2013). Dzhavakhishvili quotes sources 
from Arkhiv Prezidenta Gruzii f. 14, op. 2, d. 28, ll. 25–26, draws on published contemporary 
documents (notably Delo Paritetnogo komiteta antisovetskikh partii Gruzii [obvinitel´noe 
zakliuchenie] [Tbilisi, 1925]), and the published memoirs of persons directly involved on the 
Chechen side. 
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might support him in case of a threat. The notion that Mitaev was actively 
pursuing plans for a rebellion, meanwhile, seems rather far-fetched. Mitaev’s 
membership in the revkom was helpful insofar as he could strengthen his 
influence in his territories and thus advance his goal of establishing law and 
order there. In fact, Mitaev had rather bluntly told the Soviet delegates during 
their meeting in Urus-Martan that he would join the revkom only if he was 
allowed to both keep his influence in his area and maintain his entourage of 
loyal supporters.121 Against this backdrop, it is difficult to see how he could 
have had an interest in threatening this position. 
Mitaev’s Arrest and the Beginnings of the Power Struggle
In the Bolshevik worldview, people such as Mitaev could ultimately only be 
seen as enemies scheduled for elimination sooner or later, especially if they 
commanded their own power bases. Moreover, members of the government 
security organs had an institutional interest in presenting the situation as 
more threatening than it really was. The better the results, expressed in the 
number of people arrested and sentenced per month, the more essential the 
agency appeared in the eyes of the state. 
But even for the North Caucasus branch of the secret police—which 
was mostly composed of hardened Bolsheviks, veterans of the Russian 
Civil War—it was not easy to bring down as significant a personality as 
Ali Mitaev. At the beginning of the 1920s, members of the secret police 
were reluctant to go into the Chechen countryside. Even in Groznyi, it was 
difficult to arrest Mitaev, since an armed retinue always escorted him to the 
revkom meetings.122 
Mitaev was alert to the possibility of being arrested by the secret police. 
For example, on 16 April 1924, when he was in Groznyi for a meeting of the 
Chechen revkom and picked up a rumor that the secret police was trying 
to arrest him, he left the town that night to escape detention. Since Mitaev 
refused to return to Groznyi afterwards, the Chechen division of the Orgburo, 
the extended arm of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist 
Party, ordered the head of the Chechen government, El´darkhanov, to do 
everything he could to persuade Mitaev to return. El´darkhanov knew that 
Mitaev could be enticed to make such a move only if he received assurances 
of safe conduct. Therefore, El´darkhanov issued a letter promising Mitaev 
immunity and sent it via his brother, Omar Mitaev. Thereupon Ali Mitaev 
did come to town on 18 April to attend the revkom meeting. The secretary 
of the Chechen Orgburo and the deputy representative of the local branch 
121 Mikoian, “Iz vospominanii,” 53.
122 Ibid., 54. 
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of the OGPU were also present at the meeting. Both assured him that a 
member of the executive committee could not be arrested, even as they 
accused him of cowardice and reproached him for not knowing his civil rights. 
Apparently, Mitaev was persuaded to come to the secret police headquarters 
under the pretext of needing to fill out a form. When he arrived in the 
company of the deputy head of the revkom, Zaurbek Sheripov (the brother 
of the famous Bolshevik Aslanbek Sheripov, who was killed in the Civil War), 
he was arrested and transferred to Rostov-on-Don the same day.
This description of events is based on a letter sent by El´darkhanov 
to the party’s Central Committee, attention Stalin, on 20 May 1924.123 
El´darkhanov, who was apparently unaware of the secret police’s plot to arrest 
Mitaev, asked Stalin for Mitaev’s immediate release. El´darkhanov did not 
claim that Mitaev was guiltless, but neither did he consider Mitaev a danger. 
Despite Mitaev’s “faults and confusions,” El´darkhanov argued, he had been 
a supportive member of the revkom and had reliably guarded the railroad 
with his followers. Since Mitaev was very popular, his liquidation would only 
strengthen his status as a “martyr for religion.” El´darkhanov even warned 
that intra-Chechen conflicts might break out, arguing that “according to local 
customs, a Chechen who [betrayed] another Chechen” would become the 
“subject of a blood feud by the victim’s entire clan.”124 
El´darkhanov found himself in a particularly precarious position. He 
was forced to defend Mitaev’s appointment to the revkom, but at the same 
time, he could not afford to appear overly sympathetic to Mitaev. Nor did 
El´darkhanov dare be seen as dependent on Mitaev for security in the latter’s 
territory, since that might give the Soviet leadership an excuse for open 
military intervention in Chechnya. Ultimately, however, El´darkhanov knew 
that his own fate was tied to that of Mitaev. Since Mitaev had come to town 
only because of El´darkhanov’s letter, he was now under El´darkhanov’s 
personal protection. If El´darkhanov did not secure Mitaev’s release, the 
secret police’s perfidious action threatened to discredit not only the revkom’s 
reputation with the Chechens but his own as well, as he complained in the 
letter to Stalin.125 It was thus hardly astonishing that El´darkhanov would 
move heaven and earth to secure Mitaev’s release. 
123 El´darkhanov to Stalin, 20 May 1924, RGASPI f. 17, op. 84, d. 538, ll. 66–67. Various 
documents give various dates for Mitaev’s arrest. The North Caucasus prosecutors’ decision 
on the Mitaev case, 24 September 1924, states that Mitaev was arrested on 26 April 1924 
(RGASPI f. 65, op. 1, d. 89, 116). 
124 RGASPI f. 17, op. 84, d. 538, l. 67. 
125 Ibid., l. 66 ob.
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Moscow did not respond to El´darkhanov’s request. The Central 
Committee passed the case on for examination to the Politburo, which 
forwarded the matter to the Orgburo on the grounds that its comrades were 
more familiar with the case.126 On a meeting on 4 June 1924, the members 
of this institution decided to “refuse El´darkhanov’s request concerning Ali 
Mitaev’s release” and to leave the Mitaev case “in the jurisdiction of the 
OGPU.”127 
Following Mitaev’s arrest, the North Caucasus branch of the secret 
police tried to undermine El´darkhanov’s position even more. In May 
1924, a particularly negative report on the situation in Chechnya reached 
the Party’s North Caucasus office in Rostov-on-Don. Its authors, Mironov 
and Evdokimov, sketched a picture of the Chechen revkom as marked by 
factional infighting, corruption inside the government, and excesses among its 
members. They charged that the money Chechnya received from the central 
government was being misapplied or even misused, leading to a budget deficit 
of 400,000 rubles.128 In a second letter, Mironov went even farther, attacking 
El´darkhanov directly and accusing him of embezzling money for personal 
purposes, enriching his own clan.129
El´darkhanov, however, did not admit defeat and took the initiative 
himself. He was particularly fierce in his rebuttal of the claim by the secret 
police that Gotsinskii and Mitaev had cultivated an active relationship and 
exchange of letters. To disprove this charge, he instigated an investigation 
in the framework of the revkom. According to various witnesses whose 
statements were taken for the record, the letter that Gotsinskii had sent to 
Mitaev, and in which he called for a rebellion against Soviet power, was a 
forgery. A certain Osman Nashaev, a known forger of documents, was stated 
to have fabricated the seal. A group including the Chechens Kusi Baigireev (a 
relative of Nashaev), Maslak Ushaev, and Magomet Vachigov from the village 
of Dyshni-Veden´ was said to have masterminded the plot.130 They had tried 
126 Gatagova et al., TsK RKP(b)–VKP(b) i natsional´nyi vopros, 222 n. 1.
127 Ibid., 222.
128 Mironov and Evdokimov to the North Caucasus office of the RCP(b), May 1924, RGASPI 
f. 65, op. 1, d. 144, ll. 3–10, here l. 3.
129 Evdokimov to Mironov, May 1924, RGASPI f. 65, op. 1, d. 142, ll. 52–61, here l. 54.
130 Maslak Ushaev (1897–1938) later worked for the secret police of the Chechen-Ingush AO 
and was appointed head of the Supreme Court in the Chechen-Ingush ASSR. In contemporary 
Chechen historiography, he is a hated figure, appearing as a “Stalinist Chekist-sadist” in 
Andrei Zelev’s online encyclopedia, “Znamenitye chechentsy i ingushi,” Entsiklopediia T–
Ia (http://www.proza.ru/2009/02/15/185, accessed 11 January 2013). See also the Internet 
blog on “Chechen traitors”: “Traitor and Executioner of the Chechen people Maslak Ushaev” 
(http://chechentraitors.blogspot.ch/2011/10/blog-post_7000.html, accessed 22 February 
2013). The Chechen writer Musa Beksultanov calls him an “atheist, informer, and murderer” 
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to create the impression that the letter from Gotsinskii had been intercepted 
by the group and later brought to Rostov-on-Don by Baigireev. According 
to witnesses, Baigireev received 15 chervontsy (Russian gold coins), which he 
shared with Maslak Ushaev. Apparently the group’s scheming was revealed 
only because the third person involved, Magomet Vachigov, took offense after 
receiving only a small share of the money and started to tell people in the 
village about the plot.131
Simultaneously, El´darkhanov compiled numerous recorded statements and 
declarations by Chechen representatives, including from Mitaev’s own Kunta-
Khadzhi (Qadiriyya) brotherhood. The purpose of these minutes was to prove 
Mitaev’s huge popular support. El´darkhanov also had copies of the documents 
sent to the Eastern Department of the Southern Bureau of the OGPU.132 In 
addition to this “proselytization among the population,” as the secret police 
described El´darkhanov’s activities, the Chechen head of government also 
gave the secret police agents an immediate taste of the agitation among the 
Chechens when they showed up for the first All-Chechen Congress of Soviets, 
which took place under El´darkhanov’s chairmanship from 29 July to 2 August 
1924 in Groznyi.133
At this meeting, which was attended by some 400 delegates, the revkom 
was officially abolished as a form of transitional government and replaced 
by a regularly elected regional executive committee (oblastnyi ispolnitel´nyi 
komitet, oblispolkom).134 Furthermore, during this session a Chechen faction 
of the Russian Communist Party was founded with some 50 members.135 
Although not previously on the agenda, the case of Ali Mitaev became one 
of the major topics at the meeting. Numerous speakers demanded that 
both Mitaev brothers (the secret police had arrested Omar as well as Ali) be 
released from detention. Confronted with the Chechens’ demands, Mikoian, 
the main speaker on the first day of the meeting, promised to communicate 
them to the responsible authorities. He also tried to calm the crowd by stating 
that the conditions of Mitaev’s detention were much better than those of 
(Beksultanow, Der Weg zurück zum Anfang: Erzählungen, Novellen, Gedichte in Prosa, trans. 
Marianne Herold and Ruslan Bazgiew [Klagenfurt: Kitab-Verlag, 2012], 138, 157 n. 5).
131 Report by Khakim Sataev, inhabitant of the village of Dyshni-Veden, 8 May 1924, 
RGASPI f. 65, op. 1, d. 142, l. 39. More reports can be found in ibid., ll. 44–45. 
132 Ibid., ll. 49–50.
133 Ibid., l. 60.
134 Minutes, GARF f-1235, op. 102, d. 495, ll. 2–2 ob., 18–19. For an abbreviated summary 
of the four-day meeting, see Kozlov et al., Vainakhi i imperskaia vlast´, 503–15.
135 Mikoian, “Iz vospominanii,” 55.
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other prisoners. At the same time, he made it understood that the case was 
outside his area of jurisdiction, since the secret police had made the arrest.136
Evdokimov also took part in the meeting in Groznyi and must have noted 
how strongly Mitaev’s arrest had stirred up the population.137 Regardless of 
his department’s efforts, it seemed that the Mitaev case might even strengthen 
El´darkhanov’s position. This very meeting may have convinced Evdokimov 
not only to remove El´darkhanov from power but to have Mitaev physically 
eliminated as well.138 The secret police continued to collect incriminating 
material against Mitaev. By autumn, they had developed their charges to the 
point that in a letter from 28 November 1924, they could insist that shooting 
Ali Mitaev was an absolute necessity. The execution, they asserted, would 
deal a blow to the “reactionary sharia counterrevolution of the entire North 
Caucasus” and would stem the threat emanating from the “Mitaev sect.”139 
However, representatives of the secret police also noted that if Mitaev were 
executed, acts of revenge against themselves and against El´darkhanov were 
likely to follow.140 
Accordingly, the secret police argued that the case should not be heard 
in open court, with confirmation by the North Caucasus public prosecutor’s 
office (prokuratura). In fact, the public prosecutor also concluded that 
Mitaev’s execution might lead not only to blood vengeance but to an increase 
in banditry. Therefore, a public trial of the case was not recommended.141 The 
Bolshevik party leadership must have agreed to this request, because the case 
did subsequently remain in the hands of the secret police. The members of 
its highest committee, the OGPU-Collegium in Moscow, however, initially 
refused the request of their colleagues in the North Caucasus. On 19 January 
1925, they sentenced Ali Mitaev to ten years’ detention. It was probably 
shortly thereafter that Mitaev was transferred from Rostov-on-Don to a jail 
in Moscow.142
The documents do not clarify why Mitaev was left alive. Maybe the fear 
of acts of revenge by his followers discouraged the secret police from taking 
this step. If we believe the explanations in a report by the Bolshevik writer 
Aleksei Kosterin, who visited Ali Mitaev’s birthplace, Avtury, at the beginning 
136 For a summary of Mikoian’s speech, see Kozlov et al., Vainakhi i imperskaia vlast´, 505–6; 
and Mikoian, “Iz vospominanii,” 56.
137 Mironov appears on the members’ list in the minutes of the meeting (GARF f-1235, op. 
102, d. 495, l. 2 ob.),
138 RGASPI f. 65, op. 1, d. 142, l. 52.
139 Ibid., d. 89, ll. 114–25.
140 Ibid., l. 114.
141 North Caucasus Prosecutor’s Office, 2–3 December 1924, ibid., l. 115.
142 Peremyshlennikova and Sevost´ianov, “Sovershenno sekretno,” 1, pt. 2:1026.
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of July 1924, tensions ran high among the local population. The murids with 
whom Kosterin talked were ready to take revenge if Mitaev was killed. They 
were honor bound to do so by their oath of allegiance to Mitaev.143 
During this time, petitions were signed at village assemblies in numerous 
Chechen settlements for the brothers’ liberation or reduction of their 
sentences. Apart from one that was addressed to Mikoian directly and signed 
by the wives of the Mitaev brothers, these petitions were issued in the form 
of resolutions by the respective village councils or presented as the minutes 
of the village council meetings, accredited with a seal of the secretary of the 
Chechen government.144 Because all these documents were written during 
the same period of time, between 22 and 28 April 1925, and because these 
petitions show a great similarity in wording (up to literal repetitions of 
whole paragraphs), it can be assumed that the whole activity was centrally 
coordinated and orchestrated. The only possible instigator of such large-scale 
activity was the Chechen government under El´darkhanov. Documents to 
this effect are available for 16 settlements in the districts of Vedeno, Shali, 
Urus-Martan, and Novo-Chechenskii, which points to Mitaev’s popularity 
among the population.145
Disarming Chechnya
On the whole, the situation in Chechnya was strained in the months after 
Mitaev’s arrest, but not quite as dramatically as the reports by the secret 
police would have us believe. For instance, the assaults on the railroad, after 
increasing initially, noticeably decreased again from the second half of 1924 
on —apparently after Mikoian, who had traveled to Chechnya for this specific 
purpose, had again tasked an armed Chechen unit led by a “former leader of 
a band” with guarding the railroad.146 The fight against banditry in general, 
too, reportedly made great progress. According to Mikoian, up to “500 
bandits” had been arrested, and many bandit leaders had surrendered.147 In 
an unpublished dictation (diktovka) of August 1971, Mikoian announced 
his belief that Feliks Dzerzhinskii and other leading figures in the Cheka had 
143 Kosterin, “Po Chechne,” 292. 
144 For the petition addressed to Mikoian, see AUP ChR f. r-1206, op. 1ks, d. 31, ll. 32–33.
145 Specifically, Goity, Staro-Sunzhenskii, Berdykel´skoe, Urus-Martan, Gekhi, Alkhan-Iurt, 
Shali, Mesker-Iurt, Ustar-Gordoi, Avtury, Bel´gatskii, Chechen-Aul, Novye Atagi, Kuraly, 
Tsatsan-Iurt, and one other settlement (name unknown) (ibid., ll. 21–62).
146 Mikoian, “Iz vospominanii,” 55.
147 Ibid.
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exaggerated the danger of assaults on trains in Chechnya: “Because at this 
point, they stopped.”148
One reason why the secret police may have been unwilling to adjust its 
negative view of Chechnya in any way was that in the meantime the notion of 
conducting a large disarmament campaign in Chechnya had taken hold of the 
Soviet leaders.149 The Bolsheviks conducted disarmament operations as early as 
the spring of 1924 in reaction to disturbances during elections to the soviets.150 
The major disarmament campaign, however, was carried out only in the late 
summer of 1925. Altogether, about 7,000 men, including Red Army troops 
and armed OGPU units, took part in the operation, which started on 23 or 25 
August 1925. Their procedure was uniform: they surrounded the settlement 
in question and called on the inhabitants to surrender their weapons. If the 
people did not follow the order, the army had the villages shelled, including 
by airplanes and using heavy artillery in some cases. According to a report by 
the army staff of the North Caucasus region, 25,299 guns, 4,319 revolvers, 1 
machine gun, and about 80,000 rounds of ammunition were confiscated during 
the two-week operation.151 Although the Chechens managed to hide some of 
their weapons and ammunition, the army probably succeeded in confiscating 
most of the Chechen arsenal in the course of the operation.152 
A key aim of the operation was to arrest leading members of rebel 
bands. At the beginning of September, an army unit discovered Gotsinskii 
in the area of Sharoevskii and called on the local population to surrender 
him. To apply pressure, the soldiers apparently took 40 elders hostage. 
When the population did not comply with the demand, the army had 
the settlements shelled for two days. Only then, on 5 September 1924, 
did Gotsinskii surrender, apparently a broken and critically ill man.153 
The extent of Gotsinskii’s authority became obvious on the journey to 
Groznyi, when according to Mikoian’s unpublished memoirs the “Chechen 
religious population” threw itself at his feet and kissed his clothes.154 This 
was probably one reason why Gotsinskii was transferred to Rostov-on-Don 
148 RGASPI f. 84, op. 3, d. 120, l. 80. These dictated passages served as drafts for the memoirs 
he published later. See Mikoian, Tak bylo, 232. 
149 Mikoian, unpublished notes, August 1971, RGASPI f. 84, op. 3, d. 120, ll. 80–81.
150 Marshall, The Caucasus under Soviet Rule, 171. 
151 GARF f. r-1235, op. 140, d. 1132, l. 8 ob. 
152 Pavel Aptekar´, “Vtoroe pokorenie Kavkaza: Bol´sheviki i chechenskie povstantsy,” 
Rodina, no. 6 (1995): 43–48; A. Iu. Lashkov, “1925 god: Spetsoperatsiia Krasnoi Armii. Tri 
chetverti veka nazad pravitel´stvennye voiska uzhe priobretali opyt likvidatsii chechenskikh 
bandformirovanii,” Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, 21 April 2000 (http://nvo.ng.ru/
history/2000-04-21/5_sp_ops.html, accessed 9 January 2013). 
153 Lashkov, “1925 god.” 
154 RGASPI f. 84, op. 3, d. 171, l. 37.
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immediately and sentenced to death by decree of the OGPU of the North 
Caucasus Region as early as 15 October 1925. His 16-year-old son, two 
of his daughters, and other family members were executed together with 
him.155 In addition to Gotsinskii, other prominent political and religious 
leaders were executed in the course of the operation.156 
The military intervention was not considered an act of punishment, so 
the losses were kept within limits. The army command’s report listed only five 
dead and nine wounded members of the Red Army and the secret police. Six 
civilians were listed as killed and 30 as wounded by artillery fire. Twelve rebels 
were killed and 300 persons arrested, of whom 105 were subsequently shot.157 
The secret police offered higher numbers in its report, recording 800 persons 
arrested, of whom 115 were shot (as of 12 October 1924).158 Five members 
of the secret police, among them Mironov, received the prestigious Order of 
the Red Banner (Orden Krasnogo Znameni ) for their achievements in arresting 
Gotsinskii and other “counterrevolutionaries” during the disarmament 
campaign.159
Since the danger of an armed rebellion appeared to have been averted at 
this point, the representatives of the secret police saw the option of physically 
eliminating Mitaev in a different light. Based on new charges submitted by 
the headquarters of the OGPU to their colleagues in Moscow, the OGPU-
Collegium rescinded its former resolution. On 26 October 1925, it decided 
to have Ali Mitaev shot.160
During the disarmament campaign and liquidation of rebel leaders, 
the Chechen government experienced political upheavals. Not only was 
El´darkhanov deposed from office on 27 September 1925, but two other 
representatives of the government, Zaurbek Sheripov and Abas Gaisumov, 
were forced to step down, suggesting that the Soviet party leadership was 
determined to make a fresh start in Chechnya.161 Chechen Communist Daud 
Arsanukaev was appointed chairman of the Chechen regional government, 
which he had served as a member up until this point.162 
155 Donogo, “Nazhmuddin Gotsinskii,” 54.
156 GARF f. r-1235, op. 140, d. 1132, l. 8 ob.; Lashkov, “1925 god.”
157 Pavel Aptekar´, “Voina bez kraia i kontsa,” Rodina, no. 1–2 (2000): 161–65, here 163; 
Marshall, The Caucasus under Soviet Rule, 172–73. 
158 RGASPI f. 78, op. 7, d. 54, ll. 3–4.
159 GARF f. r-1235, op. 140, d. 1132, l. 3. See also A. Avtorkhanov, Memuary (Frankfurt am 
Main: Posev-Verlag, 1983), 314.
160 The exact date of the execution is unknown (Peremyshlennikova and Sevost’ianov, 
“Sovershenno sekretno,” 1, pt. 2:1026.
161 RGASPI f. 78, op. 7, d. 54, l. 4. 
162 Ibid.
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Bolshevik Policy in the Muslim Periphery 
Mikoian refers to the co-optation of Ali Mitaev in his memoirs as an 
experiment, which was ultimately unsuccessful because Mitaev remained 
essentially “hostile to Soviet power” and played a “double game.”163 To be 
sure, the experiment failed not because of Mitaev’s allegedly anti-Soviet 
activities, but because the Bolsheviks never seriously intended to share power 
with such people in the first place. In fact, it was precisely during Mitaev’s 
appointment as a member of the revkom that overall Soviet policy started to 
shift and became markedly less flexible regarding cooperation with Muslims. 
The Red Army managed to put down the Gotsinskii rebellion in the 
North Caucasus by the spring of 1921, and the Basmachi armed insurrection 
by mid-1922. No third force would later seriously threaten the Bolsheviks’ 
hold on power, even if it remained fragile. To Evdokimov, Mironov, and 
their ilk, it must have seemed odd that Bolsheviks sought the cooperation 
of a Chechen religious leader at the very time when their grip on power 
was stronger than ever before. In fact, the Bolshevik leadership itself signaled 
in May 1923 that it would take a tougher line when it arrested the well-
known Tatar Communist Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev, one of the most outspoken 
representatives of coexistence between socialism and Islam and a supporter 
of a united Turkestan.164 Possibly spurred by this arrest, Moscow also sought 
to weaken the strong clerical establishment in Central Asia, with the Central 
Asia Bureau of the Communist Party initiating extensive purges of party and 
state organizations in Bukhara.165 
The actions of the local branches of the secret police in the North 
Caucasus, crude as they may have seemed, were thus ultimately in line with 
the overall strategy to cement the Bolsheviks’ hold on power by purging 
government and party structures of “undesirable elements.” Dissent regarding 
Mitaev’s inclusion into the revkom, which arose between the representatives 
of the Southeastern Bureau and the North Caucasus branch of the secret 
police, was always over tactics, not strategy. 
Precarious, in this respect, was the position of indigenous national 
Communists, often caught between the fronts. Ultimately, El´darkhanov fell 
not because some of the leading Bolsheviks in the North Caucasus region 
viewed him with suspicion and at times even despised him but because of 
163 Mikoian, “Iz vospominanii,” 54.
164 Sultan-Galiev (1892–1940) played a crucial role during the revolution and the war in the 
Volga and Central Asian regions and was politically important in the early 1920s (R. G. Landa, 
“Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev,” Voprosy istorii, no. 8 [1999]: 53–70). 
165 Out of the 202 Bukharan Communist Party members purged, 12.4 percent were clergy. 
See Shoshana Keller, To Moscow, Not Mecca: The Soviet Campaign against Islam in Central Asia, 
1917–1941 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001), 74.
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his entanglement with the Mitaev case. Instead of clearly distancing himself 
from Mitaev after the latter’s arrest, El´darkhanov tried to mobilize Chechen 
society to support his concerns. He seems to have been only moderately 
successful, however, as numerous Chechen Islamic authorities, especially 
in the mountain regions, never regarded themselves as followers of Mitaev 
(or, consequently, of El´darkhanov) and reportedly even offered the Soviet 
authorities their active armed support against these “counterrevolutionary” 
forces.166 
In spite of the drama surrounding the case of Mitaev and the subsequent 
political upheaval, the intervention of the Bolsheviks in Chechnya remained 
selective. The removal of El´darkhanov in the mid-1920s did not yet mark 
the beginning of mass arrests and executions of national Communists. Those 
would characterize a later time, during the Stalinist purges of 1937–38, when 
a whole generation of Russian and non-Russian communist leaders was wiped 
out. In this respect, it is significant that El´darkhanov, after his removal from 
power, was not arrested but received a new administrative post in the newly 
formed Committee of the Communist Party of the North Caucasus Region 
(Kavkraikom) in Rostov-on-Don. In 1929, he returned to Groznyi to take 
on an executive position at Grozneft´. On 14 November 1934, El´darkhanov 
died after a short illness.167
I would also note that the disarmament campaign of 1925, heavy-handed 
though it was, was an operation with clearly defined military and political 
aims, not a prelude to “genocide,” an attempt to carry out the concerted 
and systematic annihilation of the Chechen people and its heritage, as some 
Chechen (and Western) historians claim.168 Disarmament campaigns were 
not confined to Chechnya. Similar operations had been carried out in other 
places, such as Karachai-Cherkessia in 1921–22 or areas of Azerbaijan in 
1923–26.169 After the military action in Chechnya, disarmament drives were 
also carried out in North Ossetia and Ingushetia in the autumn of 1925 and 
in Dagestan in September 1926.170 It was only toward the end of the 1920s, 
166 Evdokimov to Mironov, May 1924, RGASPI f. 65, op. 1, d. 142, ll. 60–61. The fact 
that Mitaev never wielded much influence in the more difficult-to-access mountain areas is 
recorded in various sources, e.g., Voroshilov to Stalin, 14 November 1923, RGASPI f. 74, op. 
2, d. 81, l. 135.
167 Shaipov, Tashtemir El´darkhanov, 24.
168 Dzh. Dzh. Gakaev, Ocherki politicheskoi istorii Chechni (XX vek), 2 pts. (Moscow: ChKTs, 
1997), 91. “Soviet Genocide” is the title of chap. 2 (which deals with the early Soviet period) 
in Dunlop, Russia Confronts Chechnya, 40–84.
169 On Karachai-Cherkessia, see Marshall, The Caucasus under Soviet Rule, 173. On Azerbaijan, 
see Baberowski, Der Feind ist überall, 533.
170 Marshall, The Caucasus under Soviet Rule, 173–74; “Chechnia: Vooruzhennaia bor´ba v 
20–30-e gody,” Voenno-istoricheskii arkhiv, no. 2 (1997): 132–35.
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together with their collectivization campaign, that the Bolsheviks started 
their all-out onslaught on religion and tradition—officially prohibiting sharia 
and adat courts, shutting down numerous Islamic schools and mosques, 
and nationalizing waqf. The attack continued in the 1930s as thousands of 
members of the Muslim clergy throughout the USSR were exiled, imprisoned, 
or shot.171
The intervention of the Bolsheviks in the political affairs of Chechnya, 
along with the disarmament campaign of the mid-1920s, did not yet mark a 
reversal of Soviet nationality policy, but it did demonstrate the limits of the 
freedom that the Bolsheviks had solemnly promised the Chechens and other 
non-Russian peoples as part of their autonomy in the early 1920s. 
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